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The rational source of both phenomenal and factive evidence lies in employing perceptual capacities: perceptual states have epistemic force due to the epistemic and metaphysical primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over employing them in hallucination or illusion.
However, when we perceive, we have additional factive evidence. Regardless of whether we are perceiving, hallucinating, or suffering an illusion, we have phenomenal evidence. Chapter 7 introduces a distinction between two kinds of evidence: phenomenal evidence (evidence that corresponds to how our environment sensorily seems to us) and factive evidence (evidence that is determined by the environment to which we are perceptually related).
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